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CAN A MURDE RER, I N T HE
ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION,
TAKE PROPERTY BY DEVISE
0R DE S C ENT?
It has been held in New York in the oase of Riggs v.
Palmer 115 N.Y. 506, that a murderer can not take proper-
ty under a will. While in Nebraska in z$e case of
Shellenberger v. Ransom 25 Law Reports Annotated 564, it
has been held that a murderer can take property by des-
cent.
In discussing these two cases it will be readily
seen that the statutes in the two states are to be
searched in order to determine: First:- Whether the legis
latures have spoken on the particular point in question.
Second:- if they have spoken, is their larj4ige clear,
accurate, and unambiguous; or is it vague, inaccurate,
3and ambiguous. In examining the statutes we find that
there has been no legislation which prohibits a murderer
from taking under a will or by descent; but we do find
that the legislature in each state has provided a way for
Property to be inherited, and a way that a will shall
take effect, pass the property thereunder, and the manner
in which it shall be revoked. The Nebraska courts have
held that their statute of descents is clear, accurate,
and unambiguous; so have the New York courts held the
same as regards their statute, which provides how a will
shall be revoked. This is the particular part of the
statute under discussion in the Riggs v. Palmer case
Supra.
In discussing these cases the principals of law in-
volved are the same in each. So in order that I may
save time for my readers, and unavoidable repetition, I
shall confine my discussion to the New York case.
In that case, the action was brought to have the
will of Francis B. Palmer, so far as it devises and be-
queathes property to Elmer E. Palmer, cancelled and an-
nulled. The facts are as follows: On the thirteenth day
of August, 1880, Francis B. Palmer made his last will and
4testament, in which he gave small legacies to his two
daughters Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, the plaintiffs in
this action, and the remainder of' his estate to his
grandson, the defendant, Elmer E. Palmer, subject to the
support of Mrs. Palmer, in case Elmer should survive him
and die under age, unmarried and without issue. The
testator, at the date of his will, owned a farm and con-
siderable personal property; he was a widower, and there-
after, in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs. Breese,
with whom, before his marriage he entered into an ante-
nuptial contract, in which it was agreed, that in lieu of
dower and all other claims upon his property, in case she
survived him, she should have her support from his farm
during her life, and such support was expressly charged
upon the farm. At the date of the will, and subsequent-
ly to the death of' the testator, Elmer lived with him as
a member of the family, and at his death was sixteen
years old. He knew of the provisions made in his favor
in the will, and that lhe might prevent his grandfather
from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested
some intention to do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment
of possession of the property, he willfully mulrdered him
by poisoning him. lie now claims the property, and the
5sole question is, can he have it?
After a long and careful study, I have come to the
conclusion that, under the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the case, Elmer E. Palmer should have been all-
owed to take the property under the will, as made by his
grandfather, Francis B. Palmer, which will was admitted
to probate, and which had not been revoked by the testa-
tor. I am sustained in my conclusion by the following
cases, viz: Shellenberger v. Ransom, Supra; Owens v.
Owens 100 N.C. 240; Deem v. Milliken, 27 Ohio L. J. 156
and 6 Ohio C. Ct. Rep. 357; also. by the following judges
who passed opinions in the Riggs'case. The referee, the
three judges of the Supreme Court, and two judges of the
Court of Appeals. So that among the eleven judges pass-
ing an opinion, six held with and five against me. In
the Court of Appeals Gray J. wrote the dissenting opinion
with which Danforth J. concurred.
Judge Danforth at the time this case was decided was
about to leave the bench, and was therefore the oldest
.judge then sitting, consequently had more experience, and
his dissenting opinion was regarded by his associates at
that time, as a hard blow to their practically new prece-
dent established by their negative decision of this case.
6Judge Danforth saw far into khe future, and foretold
that such statutory construction was being carried too
far for the good and welfare of the whole legal profes-
sion, as well as for the private citizen. He saw that
Stare Decisis would either have to fail or else the de-
cision of his five associates could not stand. He saw
in this advancing age of civilization that the rigid
rules laid down by kings and cormon law judge$,could not
be followed accurately and with the same results as of
old. One text writer in speaking of Judge$ Danforth's
opinion on this case said:- "It is strange how such an
old, reliable and learr~ed judge could make such a bad
mistake as to give reward for murder." That text writer
recognized the great judge's ability, but did not go deep
enough into the case to determine the reasons for his
conclusion. And, I think, if Judge Danforth's five as-
sociates had studied the various rules for statutory con-
struction more carefully, and deliberated longer upon the
danger their negative decision would cause, they, too,
would have reached the same conclusion as did their sen-
ior brother, and would have seen that anyv other decision
than that would be clearly beyord their ,1udicial author-
i ty.
VThe one point in this case is statutory construction#.
Can the statute be construed in the marner adopted by the
majority judges in this case, or must the statute stand
as the legislature made it? Turning to page 2,548 of
the eighth edition of the Revised Statutes of New York,
we find this statute. No will in writing except in the
cases hereinafter mentioned, nor any part thereof, shall
be revoked, or altered, otherwise than by some other will
in writing, or some other writing of the testator, declar-
ing such revocation or alteration, and executed with the
same formalities with which the will itself was required
by law to be executed, or unless such will be burnt, torn
cancelled, obliterated or destroyed, with the intent and
for the purpose of revoking the same, by the testator
himself, or by another person in hid presence, by his
direction and consent; and when so done by another per-
son the direction and consent of the testator, the .fact
of such injury or destruction shall be proved by at least
two witnesses.
It will be readily seen that the statute is a remed-
ial statute as to personal property and should be l1ber-
ally construed, but as to real property it is in deroga-
gation of the common law and should be construed strictly
8It is enough for our purpose to say that a reme:diLl stat-
ute is one that remedies the common law, while a deroga-
tory statute is one th at partly repeals the common law,
or gives a law that was not allowed by the common law.
As the will in this-case carried both real and personal
property we will allow that the statute is only remedial,
and by givii it as liberal a c.nstruction as the law
will allow, d4termine whether or not such a construction
can be given it as will warrant the f'inal decision in
this case.
Judge Earl in his opinion seems to think bhat by
liberal construction is meant both a rational Interpre-
tation and ar equitable construction. He acknowledges
that the statute before him Is plain and unambiguovs in
its term; yet he uses so called rational interpretation.
He says that, it is a familiar canon of construction that
thing which is within the int4ion of' the makers of a
statute is as much within the statute as if it were with-",
In the Jetteratc. This is true, but to determine what
the legislators intended we must lo ok to their words 0
interpret them to determine their thoughts. We cannot
start out upon some haphazard supposition to determine
what thoughts cour@ d through a mar's mind simply because
9we suppose he would think as ourselves under like case
and circimstance. We must first have some signs he has
left or given us as a foundation upon which to start our
gray matter in search of his intent. A rational inter-
pretation is not applicable in this case. Rutherforth in
his Institutes at -ages 406 and 407 gives us the follow-
ing information. "A promise or a contract, or a will
gives us a right to whatever the promisor, the contractor
or the testator design to make ours. But this design
or intention if it is considered merely as an act of his
mind, can not be known to any one besides himself. So
when we speak of his design or intention as the measure
of our claim we must necessarily be understood to mean
the design or intention which he has made known or ex-
pressed by some outward mark; because a design or 4n in-
tention which does not appear, can have no more effect,
or can no more produce a claim, than a design or inten.-
tion which does not exist.
In like manner the obligations that are produced by
the civil laws of our country, arise from the intention
of' the legislator, not merely as this intention is an
act of the mind, but as it is declared or expressed by
some outward sign or mark, which makes it known to us.
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For the intention of the legislator, which he keeps to
himself, produces no effect , and is of' no more account
than if he had no such intention. When we hve no
knowledge we can be under no obligation. We can not
therefore be obliged to complyo with his will, when we do
not know for sure what his will is, and we can no other-
wise know what his will is than by means of' some outward
sign or mark by which this will is expressed or declared
either in plain or ambiguous terms. If his will is ex-
pressed in plain words then those words are his will or
intent ar interpretation isArequired. But if' this will
is expressed In ambiguous terms only so much the harder
is it to determine his will or intent. It is only in
the latter case that interpretation is allowed or required
to find his meaning, will, or intent. It is nLecessary
in most all cases to go outside of' the legislator's am-
biguous words to determine his intent, ahd to use some
ether signs or marks than his words, to find our- his in-
%.nt."
Judge Earl says: "The writ~es of' law do not always
express their intention perf'ectly, but either exceed it
or f'all short of' it, so that jU~des are to collect it
f'rom rational or probable conjectures and this is called
11
rational interpretation." The learned judge does not
give his readers the exact definition of rational inter-
pretatin,, but constructs it from parts of Rutherford so
that it misleads their minds and just fits his side of
the case. Rutherford says: "There are three kinds of
interpretation to wit: the literal, the ratior4,and the
mixed. Where the speaker's or writer's words do not
express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it or
fall short of it, so that we are to collect it from prob-
able or rational conjectures only, this is rational in-
terpretation." But the words in this statute do ex-
press the writer's intention perfectly, so that thete is
no chance for ary kind of interpretation.
Taking up next the equitable interpretation of stat-
utes or rather equitable construction, nearly all text
writers agree that such a c-)nstruction admits within the
operation a class of cases which are neither expressly
named or excluded, but which, from their analogy to the
cases which are named, are clearly and Justly within the
spirit and general meaning of the Taw. But in this stat -
ute under consideration it is provided that a wilt shall
not be revoked otherwise than there expressly stated. S 0
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it would seem that this construction is not applicable
in this case, becalse the statute by its terms excludes
any other case than those there mentioned.
It is not at all uncertain but what the legislators
summoned a similar case before their minds at the time
this statute was enacted, and concluded that as long as
the pumishment had been meted out by them for all rmurder-
ers, that would be sufficiettt, and that those persons
claiming through the devisee or legatee murderer should
n~t be deprived of their share in the property disposed
of by the will. How do the courts know whether the tes-
tator wanted the plaintiffs in this action to have th-p-
property or tihe persons taking through the murderer?
What right have they to step in and revoke a will for the
testator and make a new one for him, simply because an
injustice is done? Are they not going too far, and tak-
ing upon themselves the power to make laws? It has been
well said that, the legislature is always at hand. Why
not refer these cases to them when there is no way of
determining their intent?
The equitable construction of a statute, as ancient-
ly understood, was meant a judicial interpretation of a
statute which, presupposing a legislature to have intend-
13
ed what is right and just, pursues and effectuiates that
intent, even though the words of' the statute were plain
and unambiguous. In construction of old statutes it
has been understood as extending to general cases the
application ojo an enactment which literally was limited
to a special ease. This construction it tolerated now,
would he resorted to with great caution ( per Polluck in
Miller v. Salmons 7 Ex. 475). The reasons for its being
given to ancient statutes were: Firstly, In consequence
of the conciseness with which they were drawn. Gwynee
v. Burnell 6 Bing. N.C. 561. Secondly, Because the
language was used with no great precision in early times,
and that acts were framed in harmony with the lax meth-
ods of interpretation contemporaneously present. Per
Lord Ellenborough in Wilson v. Kumbley 7 East 134.
Thirdly, It has been accounted for by the fact that in
those times the dividing line between the legislature and
judicial f'unctions was feebly drawn, and the imprtance of
the separation imperfectly understood. Sedgwick int.
of Statutes 311. Fourth~ly, That the jurisdiction of
common law and equity was committed to the same courts,
and th~at, by blending law and equity together, great lat-
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itude was given to the judges in matters of propriety to
modify the laws in order to meet the purposes of' ustice
in particular cases. (Dwarris on Stat. Cons. 699.)
Fifthly, The ancient practice of having the statutes
drawn by the judges from the petitions and the answers
of the King. (Coke's Littleton 272a). The jildges
would naturally be disposed to construe the language in
which they framed the statute as their own, and therefore
with freedom and indulgence.
It can hardly he said that any of these reasons can
be taken at this time as authority for equitable construc-
tion by our courts. Yet Judge Earl quotes Coke and
Blackstone as freely as though this case was being tried
away back in the tirae of those learned jurists. It will
be almost impossible to refer in this paper to all of
the authorities on this particular branch of statutory
construction, but in order to convince my readers that
the decision of this case in the Court of' Appeals was
wrong, I have thought it best to collect some of the most
important of' these authorities, both in this country and
in England, which will, I think, show that in modern
times this kind of' construction has practically f'allen
into disuse.
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"This principal of equitable construction has fall-
en into discredit, and become looked upon with distrust,
and courts of chancery endeavor to adhere to the much
Vore logical rule that, equity follows the law. Yet
there are some exceptions which have been established."
(Sedgwick on Stat. Cons. P. 311). The exceptions appear
Aostly in cases that are based upon contract aId the stat o
ute of frauids which has been found to be very loosely
drawn., and impossible to bring all the cases within its
letter.
"A remedial statute must be construed if possible
so as to correct the mischief at which it is aimed. B
if the language is very explicit there is great danger
in departing from the words used to give an effect to
the law which may be supposed to have been designed by
the legislator." (6 B. and C. 475; 10 Peters 524; 3 B.
and C. 182). "The duty of the judge is to adhere to the
legal text, and not to travel out of what expressly or
implie4ly says." "We can not aid the legislature's de-
fective phrasing of an act; we can not add and exand, and
by construction make up defects which are left out."
(Dwarris P 704). The language of statuItes,4 but more es-
pecially modern statutes, must neither be extended beyond
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its natural and proper meaning in 0rder to supply defects
nor strainJto meet the justice of' an individual case."
(7 Queens Bench at P. 185). "It is a principal in the
English law that an act of parliauent delivered in clear
and intelligible terms car. not be questioned, or its au-
thority controlled in any court of jstice. If the
statute be too palpable in its direction to admit of but
one constructkon there is no doubt in the English law,
as to the binding efficacy of" the statute. The will of
the legislature is the supreme law of the land.: Al-
though it is undoubtedly true that judges when interpret-
ing the laware to explore the intent of the legislature,
yet it is equally true that the construction to be. put
upon an act, must be such as is warranted, or at least
not repugnant to the words of' the act. Where the object
of the legislature is plaii, and thq words of the act un-
equivocal, courts ought to adopt such a construction as
will best effectuate the intent of" the law makers; but
they must not, even in order to give effect to what they
may suppose to be the intention of the legislature, put
the provision of a statute a constru ction not supported
by the words, even though the consequences should be to
defeat the objects of' the act." (Rex v. Stoke Damerel 7
17
B and C. 569). "Where the legislature has used words of
plain and definite import, it would be dangerous to put
upon them a construction which would amount to holding
that the legislature did not intend to mean what they had
clearly said. The courts are not to prestune the inten-
tion of the legislature; they are to collect it from the
words of the act." (6 B and C. 712). Lord Tenderden in
one case said: "Our decision may perhaps in this partic-
ular case operate to defeat the object of the statute,
but it is better to abide by this consequence than to put
upon it a construction not warranted by the words of the
act, in order to carry out what we may suppose to be the
intent of the legislature." (Rex v. Bolton 8 B. and C.
104). Equity can not relieve against the express pro-
visions of a statute. (11 Vesey at P 627; Law Reports
ch. D. P. 297; Wilberforce on statutes at P. 238 and 9;
Potters Dwarris on Statutes at Ps 239 and 44; 7 B. and C.
569. 17 Wendall 304.) The citations already referred to
are mostly those from English authorities. I will now
refer br'iefly to American au~thorities.
Mr. Justice Chase in Priestrnant&United States Pt /
Dallas 30. said: "By the rules which are laid down in
18
England for the construction of statutes, and the lati-
tude which has been indulged in their application, the
British judges have assumed a legislative power and in
the pretense of judicial exposition, have in part made a
great portion of the statute law of the kingdom. Of
these rules of construction, none can be more dangerous,
than that which distinguishes between intent and the words
of th0 legislature which declares that a case not within
the meaning of the statute, according to the opinion of
the judges, should not be embraced within the operation,
although it is clearly within the words; and vice versa
that a case within the meaning, though not within the
words, shall be embraced. Sitting in an American Court
he should always deem it a duty to conform to the expres-
sions of the legislature, to the letter of the statute,
when free from ambiguity and doubt, without indulgence in
speculationupon the impropriety or hardship of the law."
Senator Verplanck in Stone etal v. The Mayor of New York
25 Wend. ,177 said: "The experience of" late years has
taught the courts the danger of excess in bold interpre-
tation, according to the presumned intent and against the
plain language of acts. The ablest and g est judges
19
have borne testimony against the evils of the ancient de-
cisions in this spirit. it is the duty of judges to in-
terpret ar-d apply the provisions of statute laws, arnd not
to supply their real or supposed effects, or to carry
out and apply their presumed policy& However rigidly
courts might Ato this intention there would often be neces
sity for great latitude of interpretation. Whatever may
have been the policy or excuse in other countries, or in
older times, for such bold construction or alteration of
legislative language, with us it is irpostility to the
genius and spirit of our republican institutiorW which
aim at laying open to every citizen, as far as possible,
a knowledge of his duty and his right. The statute
books, and the laws of our annual legislation would be-
comeunder such an arbitrary system of determination,
not merely a sealed book to the private citizen, or the
inferior magistrate, but would lead into constant error
when the language of the legislative, was apparently the
most simple, direct, intelligible, and technical,-it
could and would be construed in a precisely con~trary
sense as to its legal effect. The rule that restr'icted
courts to the interpretation of the statute, and Anhibit-
ed them from altering or amen~ding it on any assued equi-
20
ty, or supposed legislative policy, was the rule of the
well regulated republican liberty as well as that of
justice and reason,"
"If the ineaning of the iegislature is clear every
technical rule of construction must yield." (Oates V.
National Bank 100 U. S. 239; Wilkinson v. Leeland 2 Pet-
ers 627.) Where the legislature has made no exception
the courts of justice can make none as this would be leg-
islating. Bank v. Dalton 9 Howard 522. * McIver v. Rag-
an 2 Wheaton 29. Troup v. Smith 20 John. 33. Hamelton
v. Smith 3 Murphy 115. The following cases warrant the
pertinent conclusion that, when the legislature, not
transcending the limits of its power, speaks in clear
language upon a question of policy. It becomes the ju-
dicial tribunals to remain silent. Hadden v. Barney 72
U. S. 107. Hyatt v. Taylor 42 N. Y. 258 In Re Powers
25 Vt. 261. State v. Liedtke 9. Neb. 464. Jewell v.
Weed 18 Minn. 272. Woodburg & Co. v. Berry 10 Ohio. St.
204. Brmer v. Briggs 37 Ohio St. 478. Kent et al v.
Mahof±'ay 10 Ohio St. 204. Flint and F. Plan~k Co. v.
Woodhull 25 Mich. 99. The case of' Kent et al v. Mahof-
fay is a very strong case, even stronger than the one
under discussion and upon the same statute. There was a
21
case in Ontario recently decided but its decision really
has no bearing upon this Riggs&case either one way or
the other. (McKinnon v. Lundy 21 Ontario Appeals 560).
Judge Earl says: "Our law makers were fauiliar with
the civil law, and they did not deem it wise or important
to incorporate into our stqtute its provisions upon this
subject. That so far as I can f ind, in no country where
the common law prevails has it been deemed important to
enact a law to provide for such a case.A Had the judge's
attention been called to the revised statutes of Mississ-
ippi he would have found that the legislature of" that
state deemed it important to enact such a law, and that
too, before any litigation had arisen on the subject.
Section 4,502 of the Annotated Code of' Miss. provides,
If any person shall willfully cause or procure the death
qr another in any manner, he shall not take the property,
or any part thereof' real or personal of" such other, under
any will, testament, or codicil; any devise to such per-
son shall be void, and as to the property so devised the
4ce~iant shall be deemed to have died intestate, etc.
Section 1554 is a like provision for property taken by
22
descent. This part of the judge's argument must fall
through, because in his own country which follows the
COMo law in the absence of' statute, one of the states
has legislated upon the subject. Butler J. in Jones V.
Smart 7 Term Rep. 53 said: We are bound to take the act
of Parliamient as they made it, a casus omissus can in no
ways be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to
make the law." See also per Bronson J. 17 Wendall 304.
It will make no difference if it appears that the omiso-
sion on the part of the legislature was a mere oversight,
and that without doubt the act would have been drawn
otherwise had the attention of the legislature been
called to the oversight at the time the act wqs under
discussion. Lane v. Bennet 7. M. W. 70. N.E. R'y v.
Leadgate L.R. 5,Queens B. 161.
The learned judge also relies upon the case of the
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong 117 U. S. 591. The
statement referred to given by Mr. Justice Field, is but
a mere dictum, as no representative of' Hunter was a party
to the action. So that case can not be taken as author-
ity. Landon J. in referring to that case said: "That
was a case of contract; it certainly could not be held
that the company had promised to pay the insurance money
23
to the murderer of the person whose life is insured.
Such a contract would be so umreasonable and against
public policy that the courts could well hold that the
minds of the contracting party had never met upon such a
proposition, and if they had the contract would be void."
But a will is not a contract. The law has pronounced
4
its sentence upon this murderer, Elmer E. Palmer, and
that sentence does hot embrace incapacity to take under
the will.A As the legislature had not imposed such a
sentence the court surely had no legal authority to do
so. Thus it seems that the law of this country must
follow the decisions reached in Nebraska, South Carolina,
and Ohio.

